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As technological capabilities expand, an 
increasing number of decision-making processes (e.g., 
rankings, selections, exclusions) are being delegated to 
computerized systems. In this paper, we examine the 
societal acceptability of a consequential decision-
making system (university admission) to those subject to 
the decision (i.e., applicants). We analyze two key 
drivers: the nature of the decision-making agent (a 
human vs an algorithm) and the decision-making logic 
used by the agents (predetermined vs emerging). 
Consistent with uniqueness neglect theory, we propose 
that applicants will be more positive toward the use of 
human agents compared to computerized systems. 
Consistent with the theory of procedural justice, we 
further argue that applicants will find the use of a 
predetermined logic to be more acceptable than an 
emerging logic. We present the details and results of a 
factorial survey designed to test our theoretical model.  
1. Introduction  
The next-generation technological era will be 
marked by the need to cope with the prevalence of 
complex and contentious digital innovations. Among 
them are automation technologies, and more 
particularly algorithmically controlled, automated 
decision-making (ADM) systems. Such systems are 
increasingly being deployed to substitute human agents 
and automate a number of decisions in highly 
consequential domains (e.g., education, immigration, 
justice) and processes (e.g., the ranking, filtering, 
selecting of people) [1], [2]. 
Undoubtedly, the choices that individuals, 
organizations, and societies will make regarding the 
design and usage of these innovations will severely 
impact the kind of society we live in and will hand over 
to next generations. On that matter, there are no doubts 
that ADM can help make the world a better place. They 
are instrumental in making several organizational and 
personal processes be more consistent, efficient, and 
scalable. For example, they are often praised for their 
existing and potential contribution to pubic 
administration [3] and to healthcare (e.g., diagnosing 
diseases, selecting treatments, discovering remedies), 
including most recently in the context of supporting 
COVID-19 diagnoses based on X-ray images [4]. 
However, several concerns have surfaced regarding the 
socio-ethical risks accompanying their widespread 
deployment, such as privacy violations, unwarranted 
surveillance, uninformed control, unfair discrimination 
[5]–[7]. Considering this new reality, some efforts have 
been made to regulate ADM, such as article 22 of the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Article 
29 Working Party’s Guidelines on automated decision-
making and profiling in Europe. However, these 
existing frameworks remain far from perfect at 
adequately addressing problems of opacity and 
discrimination related to machine learning processing 
and the explanations of automated decision-making [8]. 
The angle taken in this paper to study this 
phenomenon is that of societal acceptability, which 
involves a broader perspective on technology 
acceptance [9]. This perspective is not just focused on 
acceptability from the point of view of the direct user of 
a system. Instead, it considers other stakeholders, 
including individuals facing the consequences of putting 
the system to use. This stance is absent from the core 
information systems outlets, but it has been prevalent in 
other field such as energy and medicine [9]. 
Societal acceptability is a particularly relevant 
research gap in the context of the diffusion of automated 
decision-making systems. We have known for a while 
that the economic success of organizations depends on 
the ability of its people to make good decisions, but 
except a few studies published in information systems 
e.g., [10] as well as adjacent fields e.g., [11]–[13], the 
perceptions from those who are subject to these 
decisions (e.g., candidates, employees, customers, 
patients,  constituents), which we refer to as decision 
recipients [14], have been much less of a focus of 
interest. Nonetheless, they are critical for the 





responsible diffusion of ADM systems and the 
reputation of the organizations deploying them. 
In addition to this research gap, we bring attention 
to another limitation in the literature, that of the lack of 
distinction made between different types of 
algorithmically controlled automation. Several studies 
frame their study of automation around the concept of 
“artificial intelligence”. For example, Longoni et al.’s 
study of patient resistance to artificial intelligence (AI) 
have defined AI as “any machine that uses any kind of 
algorithm or statistical model to perform perceptual, 
cognitive, and conversational functions typical of the 
human mind, such as visual and speech recognition, 
reasoning, and problem solving”	 [13]	 p.	 630.	 The	
concepts	of	algorithms and AI can be fuzzy and mean 
different things to different communities [15], [16]. To 
be more specific, we distinguish two families of 
algorithmically controlled automation logic: (i) rules-
based systems, in which the algorithmic logic is 
hardcoded by developers, leaving little flexibility once 
deployed, and (ii) machine learning systems, for which 
the logic “emerges” from a model that learns from being 
applied to a data set [17], [18]. 
Our research is thus led by the following question: 
Do automation and automation logic matter to the 
societal acceptability of a decision-making process? To 
explore this question, we theorize on the effects of two 
factors: 1) the agent in charge of the decision (a human 
vs. an algorithm), and 2) the logic underlying the 
decision-making process (following a predetermined vs. 
an emerging logic).  
The rest of the paper presents the conceptual 
framing for this research, the hypotheses that we intend 
to test, the empirical design - a factorial experiment 
based on manipulated scenarios of a university 
admission process, and some key results and 
implications.  
2. Theoretical background  
2.1. Automated decision-making (ADM) 
For better or for worse, our world is rife with 
automated processes, and it has been so for a few 
decades. However, the phenomenon and its 
consequences have started to generate serious concerns 
as of lately. The increasing availability of data and 
sophistication of algorithms (including the rebirth of 
machine learning / neural networks [19]) has enabled 
more uses and misuses of algorithmically controlled, 
automated decision-making (ADM, for short) [15]. The 
 
1 Data protection working party. Directive 95/46/EC § 
Articles 29 and 30  
scaling of such innovations has happened in a context 
where algorithms, which still bear little accountability 
[8], [20], are involved in automating news 
recommendations [21], [22], advertising [23], but also 
work [24], [25][26] and other highly sensitive processes 
such as social ranking, crime prediction, and bail, parole 
and criminal sentencing [27]–[29]  . 
Experts and researchers have offered different 
definitions for ADM. For example, the European 
Commission describes it as “decisions by technological 
means without human involvement”1. The Canadian 
government, in its Directive on automated decision-
making, defines automated decision systems as “any 
technology that either assists or replaces the judgement 
of human decision-makers. These systems draw from 
fields like statistics, linguistics, and computer science, 
and use techniques such as rules-based systems, 
regression, predictive analytics, machine learning, deep 
learning, and neural nets.”2 For Newell and Marabi, 
algorithmic decision-making occurs when “data are 
collected through digitized devices carried by 
individuals such as smartphones and technologies with 
inbuilt sensors – and subsequently processed by 
algorithms, which are then used to make (data-driven) 
decisions” [26] pp. 4. 
In other words, the several definitions of ADM 
indicate that there are several shades of grey in the world 
of automated decision-making – from algorithms 
supporting and augmenting human agents’ decision-
making to humans fully delegating the task to 
algorithms [11], [15], [30], [31]. This is in line with Rai 
et al.’s view that as digital technologies continue to 
penetrate our work and daily lives, we are observing the 
design and deployment of a variety of human-AI 
hybrids that range in human-AI interdependence from 
substitution (AI replaces humans) to augmentation 
(humans and AI augment one and another) and 
assemblage (AI and humans are dynamically brought 
together to function as an integrated unit) [32]. This 
contemporary take on ADM relates to the distinction 
made in the early literature on expert systems (ES) and 
decision-support systems (DSS). A DSS was considered 
to be helping people (e.g., managers, consumers) make 
decisions (often characterized as ill-structured 
problems) [33]. In turn, an ES was viewed as a computer 
program (often based on AI techniques) that  mimicked 
experts at making complex, non-algorithmic decisions 
[34], [35].  
In general, ADM tends to promote technological 
autonomy at the expense of human agency. As we 
explain next, ADM systems are often, but not always, 
2 https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=32592#appA  
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supported by sophisticated machine-learning based 
artificial intelligence [36].  
2.2. AI, algorithms, and algorithmic 
transparency 
We purposefully distinguish between ADM and AI 
because the latter remains a fuzzy-defined term that 
encompasses ideas larger than ADM [15]. For example, 
according to the European Commission, AI refers to 
“systems that display intelligent behaviour by analysing 
their environment and taking actions – with some degree 
of autonomy – to achieve specific goals. AI-based 
systems can be purely software-based, acting in the 
virtual world (e.g., voice assistants, image analysis 
software, search engines, speech and face recognition 
systems) or AI can be embedded in hardware devices 
(e.g., advanced robots, autonomous cars, drones or 
Internet of Things applications).” (European 
Commission, p. 10). 
ADM systems process information in the form of 
input data using an algorithm to generate an output of 
some kind. According to Gillespie [16], an algorithm is 
“a recipe composed in programmable steps,” (p. 19) 
designed for the purpose of “organizing and acting on a 
body of data to quickly achieve a desired outcome.” (p. 
19). Simply put, it is a set of instructions.  
Importantly, algorithms vary in the extent to which 
these instructions are made transparent. The notion and 
demand for algorithmic transparency is not new. A first 
example of legal regulation of algorithmically 
controlled, automated decision-making in the US dates 
back to 1984 when it became required that the criteria 
used in the algorithms be provided (to any person upon 
request) [15]. More recently, the European Union AI 
Strategy states that “in order to increase transparency 
and minimise the risk of bias or error, AI systems should 
be developed in a manner which allows humans to 
understand (the basis of) their actions” (pp. 10)3. The 
need for algorithmic transparency has been raised in 
various domains of application including the news 
media [37]. In that domain, the idea of algorithmic 
transparency is to “publicly show and reveal the 
workings of computational systems in order for users to 
discern the embedded values of specific algorithms” 
[38] pp. 253. 
The issue of algorithmic transparency becomes 
particularly salient in the context of machine learning 
algorithms, which are known to be more prone to 
opacity [39]. Modern algorithms rely on technique such 




using a large, existing corpus of data, which allows the 
algorithm to classify and “generalize beyond the 
examples in the training set.” [40] pp. 80. This differs 
from “manual programing” as Domingos put it, or rules-
based programing, in which the instructions do not 
emerge from data but are predetermined by those 
developing the algorithms. 
2.3. Psychology of automation  
A stream of literature is fast developing about 
people’s responses to the growing role of automation 
and algorithms.  
One stream of thought contends that machines are 
supposed to and perceived to be more systematic and 
freer of ideological bias, leading to a preference toward 
delegating decisions to machines instead of putting 
human agents in charge [41]. Consistent with this idea, 
Logg et al. found that participants who faced “black 
box” algorithms in their experiments were still willing 
to rely on that advice despite its mysterious origins [12]. 
Two other studies also reported evidence of such 
leaning, commonly referred to as algorithmic 
appreciation [11], [42]. In Araujo et al. [11], the 
decisions taken automatically by an AI agent were often 
evaluated on par or even better than in the case of human 
experts for specific decisions.  
In contrast , earlier research argued that humans 
tend to irrationally dismiss the superior accuracy of 
statistical model over human intuition and to distrust 
algorithms [43]. The underlying idea of humans being 
preferred to computerized agents for advice or 
recommendation has been corroborated in several 
situations. For example, people tend to prefer friends 
over algorithmic recommender for preferential choice 
problems (e.g., finding a book or a movie) [44]. Patients 
are more reluctant to utilize healthcare provided by AI 
than a human provider, in part by fear of uniqueness 
neglect, that is, a concern that AI providers are less able 
than human providers to account for consumers’ unique 
characteristics and circumstances [13]. People also tend 
to hate being managed by algorithms [45]. In this 
context of work and automated managerial decisions, 
human responses have been shown to be contingent on 
the task being automated. Lee observed that with 
mechanical tasks, algorithmic and human-made 
decisions were perceived as equally fair and trustworthy 
and evoked similar emotions. However, with human 
tasks (when human judgment is needed), algorithmic 
decisions were perceived as less fair and trustworthy 
and evoked more negative emotion than human 
decisions [46]. 
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Overall, existing findings indicate that there is no 
clear and definite pattern when it comes to assessing 
people’s response to automation. Human beings tend to 
oscillate between algorithmic appreciation [12] and 
algorithm aversion [47] depending on contextual factors 
such as the expertise of the human agent and the task 
being automated.		
3. Hypotheses development 
Our research model is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Research Model 
 
We conceptualize societal acceptability through 
decision recipients’ attitude toward the decision-
making process. We examine attitude because it refers 
to an overall evaluative judgment of a psychological 
object [48], and it has been considered a key facet of 
acceptability [49]. Our hypotheses rely on two 
theoretical mechanisms regarding the effects of 
automation (i.e., decision-making authority) and that of 
the underlying decision-making logic on acceptability.  
The first mechanism, based on people’s fear of 
uniqueness neglect, predicts that decision recipients will 
be less receptive to automated decision-making because 
of a concern that their unique characteristics, 
circumstances, and symptoms are more likely to be 
neglected by a machine than by a human (i.e., 
uniqueness neglect). Several theories in psychology 
(e.g., self-identity theory, social comparison theory 
[50][51]) stress the idea that individuals feel 
idiosyncratic, that is, unique and different from others. 
However, individuals realize that computerized systems 
tend to (over) standardize and dehumanize processes 
[52], [53], preventing the ability to consider and value 
their uniqueness [54]. Based on this, we propose the 
following hypotheses associated with the effects of 
decision-making authority: 
H1a. Decision recipients experience higher 
feelings of human neglect when the decision-making 
authority is an algorithm. 
H1b. The feeling of uniqueness neglect has a 
negative effect on decision recipients’ attitude toward 
the decision-making process. 
The second mechanism is that decision recipients 
will be less receptive (i.e., acceptability will be lower) 
when the decision-making logic generates inferences 
made on the basis of emerging rules because of a lack of 
perceived fairness in the evaluation procedure 
(procedural justice). This logic relies on the idea that 
predetermined, rules-based inferences are more 
effective at enabling algorithmic transparency than 
inferences that are ‘adaptive’, i.e., that emerge based on 
historical data, because the logic is explicitly coded in 
the algorithm. According to procedural justice, a 
decision process is perceived to be fair if it meets 
procedural justice criteria like consistency, lack of bias, 
and correctability [55], [56]. Such characteristics are 
more likely to be perceived and salient when individuals 
are subject to decisions that are the result of a 
standardized process whose evaluation criteria are clear 
and observable, which fits better with a rules-based 
decision-making logic. Therefore, we propose the 
following hypotheses:  
H2a. Decision recipients perceive a lower degree 
of procedural justice when the decision-making logic is 
emerging. 
H2b. Procedural justice has a positive effect on 
decision recipients’ attitude toward the decision-making 
process. 
4. Methodology 
To test our hypotheses, we employed a factorial 
survey method, which applies an experimental approach 
to a scenario-based survey [57], [58]. The scenario part 
of this method enables the development of rich 
contextual situations while the experimental part 
enables the manipulations of these situations to explore 
dimensions of theoretical interest. The factorial survey 
method is frequently used to study human beliefs and 
judgments [59], and it is starting to gain prominence in 
information systems research e.g., [60], [61]. In this 
study, we have chosen a full-factorial design, where two 
factors are manipulated over two dimensions (decision-
making authority: human vs. automation; decision-
making logic: predetermined vs. emerging) yielding 
four treatments groups in total. 
4.1. Scenario design 
We developed our scenarios in the context of 
university admission, showcasing a process in which the 
agent responsible for analyzing and selecting candidates 
and the process used to conduct this task varied. We 
selected university admission because education is a 
high-stakes domain in which automation is appealing 
for efficiency reasons but is also likely to generate 














The scenarios were articulated as follow. The first 
part remained the same across conditions: 
“Imagine that you are applying to a graduate 
program at a university. You are requested to fill an 
online form and to upload complementary 
documentation (including your grades as well as 
letters of intent and recommendation). This 
information will be used by the university to make 
admission offers. More specifically, the program 
admission website specifies that:” 
The second part was treatment-specific: 
[T1: algorithm x predetermined] "Candidates are 
ranked by a computerized system which relies on 
quality criteria and standards specified in the 
publicly available school's admission'' 
[T2: algorithm x emerging] "Candidates are ranked 
by a computerized system, which relies on 
historical admission data to predict the likeliness 
of whether a candidate will successfully complete 
the program'' 
[T3: human x predetermined] "Candidates are 
ranked by the program's academic advisor who 
relies on quality criteria and standards specified 
in the publicly available school's admission'' 
[T4: human x emerging] "All files are processed by 
a faculty member who relies on their experiential 
knowledge to predict the likeliness of whether a 
potential applicant will successfully complete the 
program.'' 
4.2. Study sampling and procedure  
The data comes from a sample of 18 years old or 
older North American adults recruited via the services 
of a well-established online market research company 
(Qualtrics). Given the study context, recruited 
participants needed to have been exposed to a university 
admission process in the past. Thus, only those who 
were either currently enrolled as undergraduate students 
of a four-year degree or had recently graduated from 
such program (less than 2 years ago) were eligible. We 
assembled a sample of N=300 complete responses, split 
just about evenly between the four treatment groups 
(T1: N=78; T2: N=73; T3: N=74; T4: N=75).  
Study participants were informed that our research 
intended to improve our understanding of student 
preferences regarding university admission. Participants 
first answered demographics questions (age, gender, 
level of education). On the survey’s following page, 
they were randomly assigned to one of the four 
treatments presenting the associated scenario. We urged 
participants to read the scenario presented to them very 
carefully. Moving to the following pages, participants 
answered questions intended to capture the research 
model’s variables. We also included realism and 
attention check questions [64], and incorporated two 
manipulation check questions (7-pt Likert scale): “in the 
scenario that was exposed to you…:” 
 (i) “A human assessed the quality of the candidates' 
applications” (participants in treatments 3 and 4 
would need to report high scores on this question for 
us to consider the manipulation effective while those 
in treatments 1 and 2 would need to report low scores),  
(ii) “The analysis relied only on criteria and standards 
specified in the school's admission policy” 
(participants in treatments 1 and 3 would need to 
report high scores on this question for us to consider 
the manipulation effective while those in treatments 2 
and 4 would need to report low scores). 
4.3. Measurements 
Most constructs were measured using multi-item 
7-point Likert-type scales ranging from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree. Measurement items (Table 1) 
were adapted from scales validated in earlier studies. 
 
Table 1. Measurement scales  
 
Uniqueness neglect: a concern that one’s unique 
characteristics, circumstances, and symptoms will be 
neglected (Longoni et al. 2019 [13]) 
 
To which extent would you be worried that the faculty member 
responsible for processing your application 
 
1. Would not recognize the uniqueness of your 
application 
2. Would not consider your unique circumstances 
3. Would not tailor the criteria of admission to your 
unique case 
Procedural justice: the perceived fairness of the 
decision-making process (Enosken 2015 [56]; Otting 
and Maier 2018 [65]) 
 
To what extent do you think the evaluation process described in the 
scenario 
 
1. Leads to admission decisions that are free of bias 
2. Relies on accurate information from the 
candidates 
3. Enables consistent evaluations of candidates' 
application 
4. Leads to decisions that can be explained to 
candidates 
5. Enables a transparent assessment of candidates 
6. Is amenable to correction if mistakes are made 
Attitude:  the overall degree of favourability toward 
the decision-making process (Ajzen 2001 [48]) 
 
In terms of its value to candidates and society in general, I would say 
that the admission process described in this scenario is (7-pt scale): 
 
1. Bad . . . . . . . Good 
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2. Foolish . . . . . . . Wise 
3. Irresponsible . . . . . . . Responsible 
4. Ineffective . . . . . . Effective 
5. Harmful . . . . . . Beneficial 
6. Immoral . . . . . . Moral 
7. Detrimental . . . . . . . Desirable 
5. Preliminary insights  
We first ran some preliminary validity tests. The 
Cronbach alphas values were all within an acceptable 
range: they were 0.80, 0.78, and 0.93 for the uniqueness 
neglect, procedural justice, and attitude constructs, 
respectively. The one-way ANOVAs ran on our two 
manipulation check questions (Table 2) confirmed the 
expected significant differences between treatment 
groups: [F(3, 294) = 58.41, p< 0.001] for MCI and [F(3, 
294) = 12.2, p < 0.001] for MC2. Post-hoc comparisons 
using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score 
of MC1 for treatments 1 and 2 was significantly 
different than for treatments 3 and 4, and that the score 
of MC2 for treatments 1 and 3 was significantly 
different than for treatments 2 and 4 (Table 2). Those 
results suggest that our manipulations (scenarios) 
functioned as expected. 
 




MC1. A human 
assessed the 
quality of the 
candidates' 
applications* 
MC2. The analysis relied 
only on criteria and 
standards specified in 
the school's admission 
policy** 
T1 2.63 5.65 
T2 2.89 4.71 
T3 5.23 5.64 
T4 5.56 4.29 
Bold: expected higher values.  
 
Next, we ran some preliminary hypothesis tests. 
Two two-way ANOVAs were conducted to compare the 
main effects of decision-making authority and decision-
making logic on uniqueness neglect (H1a) and 
procedural justice (H2a). In the first test (H1a), the main 
effect of decision-making authority yielded an F ratio of 
F(1,296) = 11.63, p<0.001), indicating a significant 
difference between the algorithm (M=5.20, SD=1.26) 
and human authority (M=4.70, SD=1.29) conditions. 
The results indicate a positive effect, in line with what 
we had hypothesized: respondents in the algorithmic 
decision-making condition reported higher level of 
uniqueness neglect than those in the human decision-
making authority condition. Thus, H1a was supported. 
In addition, note that decision-making logic and the 
interaction of decision-making logic and decision-
making authority had no significant effects on 
uniqueness neglect. 
In the second test (H2a), the main effect of 
decision-making logic on procedural justice yielded an 
F ratio of F(1,296) = 1.791, p=0.18), indicating a non-
significant difference between a predetermined 
(M=4.20, SD=1.15) and emerging logic (M=4.02, 
SD=1.19). Thus, H2a was rejected. Note that decision-
making authority and the interaction of decision-making 
logic and decision-making authority had no significant 
effects on procedural justice either. 
We tested H1b and H2b using simple linear 
regressions. The results indicate that uniqueness neglect 
is a significant predictor of attitude, F(1,298) = 40.9, p 
< 0.001 with an R-square of 11.77%. Attitude decreases 
by 0.37 for each point gained on the uniqueness neglect 
scale. This result is in line with what we had 
hypothesized in H1b (a negative effect of uniqueness 
neglect on attitude). Running a similar analysis with 
procedural justice as the independent variable yielded an 
F ratio of F(1,298) = 173.9, p < 0.001 with an R-square 
of 36.64%. The results indicate that attitude increased 
by 0.71 for each point on the procedural justice scale, 
which is in line with what we hypothesized (a positive 
effect of procedural justice on attitude, H2b). 
In summary, we found strong significant effects 
of both uniqueness neglect and procedural justice on the 
societal acceptability of decision-making procedures, 
conceptualized through decision recipients’ attitude 
toward the decision-making procedure. We also 
observed that automation mattered because algorithmic 
authority generated significantly higher feelings of 
uniqueness neglect compared to when a human was in 
charge. Finally, we did not find any evidence that 
algorithm type matters to acceptability, a finding that 
goes against what we had expected based on the body of 
work highlighting the value that people (including 
decision recipients) place in fair and transparent 
decision rules and processes. 
6. Limitations and next steps 
This study has limitations that need to be 
acknowledged. First, in retrospect, we have realized that 
the sampling approach has excluded people who went 
through the process of applying to university but ended 
up being unsuccessful (that is, their applications were 
denied). These people might have had a systematically 
different experience than that of those who were 
successful in the process and who constituted the totality 
of our sample. Second, it has been a challenge 
operationalizing the emerging logic treatments, both for 
a human and an algorithmic authority, and this may 
contribute to explain the lack of effect on procedural 
justice that we observed. We first intended to mention 
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the term “machine learning algorithm” in the scenarios 
but we reasoned that it makes more sense to expose 
potential decision recipients to key characteristic of an 
emerging (algorithmic) logic instead of just referring to 
machine learning (which may mean many different 
things to different people). This led us to focus 
operationalization of emerging logic on the idea of an 
algorithmic logic relying on historical data as a predictor 
of admission success, but we are aware that it is 
incomplete and that other instantiations are possible.  
Aside from method, it is possible that our research 
model put too strong of an emphasis on the expected 
value of algorithmic transparency (thus procedural 
justice). Recent research has noted that complete 
transparency may not be fully feasible or desirable and 
suggests that accountability may be a stronger driving 
force of acceptability e.g., [66], [67], an avenue that 
future work would need to explore further. 
7. Conclusion  
Our study explores the social acceptability of 
algorithmically controlled automated decision making 
with a unique emphasis on the effect of different 
evaluation procedures (e.g., algorithms based on a 
predetermined logic vs algorithms based on an emerging 
or ‘adaptive’ logic. Given the increased use of opaque 
adaptive algorithms (often referred to as machine 
learning)  to automate decisions in highly consequential 
domains, it is critical to account for the perceptions of 
those subject to the decisions delegated to algorithms. 
The societal acceptability lens adopted in this paper is 
in line with this position and contributes to the 
advancement of a more responsible diffusion process of 
ADM. 
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